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Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will de-
termine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed 
a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from 
Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited 
modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic 
entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen 
JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the de-
tails following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems 
and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft 
at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these 
will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from 
Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same de-
cision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds 
to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in 
airspace are durably limited. 
The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire con-
tinent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the 
coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong 
to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem 
with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European 
member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the 
achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any 
Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service 
earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation 
multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces 
is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be 
termed an ever more porous sky. 
Tribute to NATO
When the states of Central Europe joined NATO 
(the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in 
1999, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia in 2004) 
they needed to adjust their armed forces to 
NATO standards, including technical standards, 
in order to gain compatibility and interopera-
bility. While NATO viewed a relatively simple 
replacement of means of communication and 
command in the new NATO member states as 
being sufficient for the ground forces and navy, 
in the case of the air forces, NATO considered 
full interoperability (capability to take joint ac-
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tion during combat) would be achieved when 
their combat aircraft would be replaced with 
machines based on Western constructions. 
Another stimulus for the modernisation of the 
stock of combat aircraft was the increasing-
ly high costs for their purchase and use. This 
provided the grounds for changing the tacti-
cal requirements for this category of weapons. 
It was already during the decline of the Cold 
War that the focus was placed on developing 
a construction that would combine the capabil-
ities required in classical air combat and attack-
ing ground targets. The reduction in the num-
ber of types of combat aircraft in use made it 
possible to save a lot of money. In effect, most 
medium-sized and small NATO member states 
switched to using one type of multi-role fighter 
aircraft (the US F-16 being the most frequent 
choice) in the 1990s at the latest. The ultimate 
use of one type of aircraft (referred to as a mul-
ti-role combat aircraft or MRCA) is currently 
the standard in NATO (the exception being the 
United States, which uses several types of com-
bat aircraft, and also the United Kingdom in the 
medium term). No evolution of this kind has 
taken place in Soviet constructions, on which 
the military equipment of the new NATO mem-
ber states is based (work on multi-role aircraft 
commenced in Russia as late as in the 1990s).
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were 
the first (and until October this year, the only 
ones among the Central European NATO mem-
ber states) to have obtained multi-role com-
bat aircraft based on Western constructions. 
In 2004, the Czech Republic leased fourteen 
Swedish JAS-39C/D Gripen aircraft, and was 
granted the right to use them until 2014. Hun-
gary also leased fourteen machines of the same 
kind, valid until 2016. Budapest signed two 
agreements: one in 2001 concerning JAS-39A/B 
(older generation aircraft) and one in 2003, 
under which newer JAS-39C/D aircraft were 
purchased. However, the Hungarian air forces 
received the Gripens as late as in 2006. Poland 
was the only one among these countries to buy 
a larger quantity of new aircraft, forty eight 
US F-16C/D Block 52, which at that time was 
the most cutting-edge version (they were sup-
plied in 2006–2008). Despite the declared mul-
ti-role capabilities, the Gripen aircraft supplied 
to the Czech Republic and Hungary were clas-
sical fighters unable to attack ground targets. 
The aircraft purchased by Poland were the only 
ones which could be classified as multi-role. 
The attempts made by Bulgaria and Romania 
since the mid-90s to acquire Western aircraft 
have been unsuccessful each time for financial 
reasons. Slovakia has not made any such ef-
forts; its air force has been unalterably based 
on post-Soviet MiG-29 aircraft, which were up-
graded in the previous decade in co-operation 
with Russia to AS standard. MiG-29 fighters, ad-
justed to achieve limited interoperability within 
NATO, have been the basic combat aircraft in 
the region for years. Apart from Slovakia, they 
are still in use in Bulgaria and Poland. The Czech 
Republic ceased to use MiG-29 aircraft already 
in 1995 (it was temporarily using older MiG-21 
fighters manufactured in Czechoslovakia under 
a licence). Romania withdrew MiG-29 in 2003 
(similarly to the Czech Republic, it used the 
post-Soviet MiG-21 construction upgraded by 
the Czech industry to Lancer standard, which 
partly met the requirements of a multi-role ma-
chine), and Hungary withdrew them in 2010.
Saving the flight capabilities
At the beginning of this decade, the countries 
from this region, except Poland, faced the need 
to make binding decisions concerning the fu-
ture of their air forces. Delaying such decisions 
Despite the declared multi-role capa-
bilities, the Gripen aircraft leased by the 
Czech Republic and Hungary were classi-
cal fighters.
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could result in a total loss of the capabilities to 
conduct combat operations in the air. The Grip-
en lease agreements signed by the Czech Re-
public and Hungary would have expired in the 
middle of the decade. In both cases the options 
included extending the lease or buying aircraft, 
not necessarily the Swedish ones (this option 
was being considered primarily in the Czech Re-
public). In turn, the post-Soviet MiG-29 aircraft 
were wearing out, and had to be modernised 
or replaced with other machines. MiG-21 in Ro-
mania could only be demobilised and replaced 
with newer aircraft. 
Hungary chose the simplest option. Already in 
January 2012, it signed an annexe to the agree-
ment of 2003 and thus extended the lease term 
by a further ten years (until 2026), and at the 
same time reduced the yearly cost. This solution 
was chosen due to the deteriorating financial 
situation in Hungary, which had originally in-
tended to buy the aircraft from Sweden after 
ten years of using them. One disadvantage of 
this solution is the very high likelihood that the 
leased machines would not be modernised in 
any way, since at the turn of the decade, when 
fifth generation aircraft (American F-35) are to 
be introduced into operation in other NATO 
member states, these machines will already 
be outdated. The Czech Republic is in a simi-
lar situation. However, the preliminary agree-
ment signed in July this year provides for the 
modernisation of the aircraft. One of the basic 
elements of this agreement is to be the upgrad-
ing of the Czech Gripen aircraft into full-grade 
MRCA through being adjusted to participation 
in air-ground operations. The modernisation is 
most likely to entail an extension of the lease 
period by twelve years, with an option for two 
more years (until 2026 or 2028). The annual 
cost has also been reduced for Prague. 
The greatest progress has been seen in Roma-
nia. Its purchase of twelve F-16A/B aircraft, 
which had been modernised to reach the MLU 
(Mid-Life Upgrade) standard, from Portugal 
will not only allow it to maintain the capabil-
ity to conduct air operations within the next 
few years, but will also offer it interoperabili-
ty within NATO. These machines will only gain 
operational readiness in 2017, when fifth gen-
eration (F-35) or 4+ generation aircraft (French 
Rafale and the British-Spanish-German-Italian 
Typhoon from the so-called “third tranche”, 
on condition that radars with so-called 
“active electronically scanned array” are in-
stalled in the European consortium’s machines) 
will be introduced into the air forces of Western 
NATO member states as standard. Therefore, 
the allies’ interoperability with what are after 
all outdated Romanian F-16 aircraft will be un-
certain. The fact that Bucharest has bought the 
machines which had previously been used not 
only by Portugal but also by the US air forces 
(three of them are to be supplied via Portugal 
directly from the US reserve) does not solve 
the question of the modernisation of the Ro-
manian Air Force; it only slightly puts it off. 
The promises which Romania’s politicians have 
made that fifth generation MRCA (F-35) will 
be introduced into operation should now be 
seen merely as declarations of intent. Even if 
Bucharest could afford to buy machines of this 
class, considering the lengthy prototype work, 
the increasing costs and the need to carry out 
the orders already placed by the participants 
of the F-35 construction programme (including 
several Western NATO member states), Roma-
nia could receive the first aircraft of this class 
at the end of the next decade at the earliest. 
It will in all likelihood be necessary by that time 
to replace the F-16A/B aircraft it is buying now 
with another machine for a transitional period, 
The fact that Bucharest has bought F-16 
aircraft, which had been used for sever-
al decades, does not solve the question 
of the modernisation of the Romanian 
Air Force. 
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 119 4
although officially the aircraft ordered now are 
to remain in operation until 2037.
None of the problems have been resolved by 
the decision Bulgaria made this June to delay 
the purchase of aircraft. It is likely to make 
a decision in the medium term analogous to 
the Romanian one (with similar consequenc-
es) and will buy between eight and twelve 
second-hand machines. These will most likely 
be the remaining Portuguese F-16A/B aircraft 
(this country could for financial reasons entire-
ly withdraw from having combat aircraft) or 
the Dutch machines which have been recently 
withdrawn from service. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that Germany will renew the proposal 
it made in January 2012, offering Bulgaria eight 
Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft from the 
”first tranche” used by the Luftwaffe. This offer 
can be accepted for other than military reasons 
(e.g. the German stance in the EU favourable 
to Bulgaria). However, this would be the least 
strategic choice – the first Typhoons are newer 
than the F-16A/B aircraft offered to Bulgaria, 
yet their construction enables them to be used 
only as classical fighter aircraft, exactly as is 
the case with the post-Soviet MiG-29 and the 
Czech and Hungarian Gripens in their present 
version. The purchase of these aircraft would 
also complicate possible logistic co-operation 
in the region. 
The agreements on repair, limited modernisa-
tion (replacing part of the components with 
slightly more modern ones) and maintenance 
by the Russian manufacturer of Slovak MiG-29 
aircraft signed in August this year should be 
seen as a costly postponement of binding de-
cisions (until November 2016). The only positive 
aspect of these agreements will be the resto-
ration to operational condition of all Slovak 
fighters (at present, probably three out of the 
twelve machines are fully operational). Howev-
er, it is worth reminding that the Russian man-
ufacturer had already undertaken to conduct 
repair and maintenance of these aircraft by the 
end of 2015 in the agreement signed in No-
vember 2011 and that this has not been imple-
mented. If the recently signed agreements are 
implemented, it is very likely that the MiG-29 
aircraft will remain in use also after the present 
maintenance agreement has expired (unless it 
is extended) until the aircraft completely wear 
out by the end of the present decade. Slovakia 
has no clear vision for the future of its air force 
once MiG-29 aircraft are withdrawn from ser-
vice. The most likely of the versions under dis-
cussion appears to be co-operation in airspace 
protection with the Czech Republic, combined 
with leasing as few as four Gripen aircraft from 
Sweden (it cannot be ruled out that Slovakia 
will try to join the talks on the extension of the 
lease term for the Swedish machines by the 
Czech Republic, which will be finalised after 
a new government is formed in Prague). In this 
case – considering the technical and training is-
sues and above all the operational and mainte-
nance costs of these machines – Slovakia would 
receive the key to JAS-39 most probably only 
after its MiG-29 aircraft have worn out. Fur-
thermore, it is still not possible to rule out that 
ultimately Bratislava will apply for its airspace 
to be covered with NATO’s Air Policing mission, 
as with the one extended over the Baltic states, 
and will decide to have no combat aircraft, ei-
ther temporarily or at all. 
The hole in NATO’s airspace
Even given the continuing reduction of expens-
es on military purposes seen over the past few 
years in NATO, and thus the reduction of the 
military potentials of NATO member states, 
the capabilities Central Europe members have 
to conduct operations in airspace are becom-
Slovakia has no clear vision for the future 
of its air force once the post-Soviet MiG-
-29 aircraft are withdrawn from service.
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ing more and more symbolic. The Western al-
lies have not consented to the adjustment of 
machines based on Soviet construction to be 
interoperable in NATO-led combat operations. 
This means that within the next decade the 
countries from this region (excluding Poland) 
will have in total 40 combat aircraft (48-56 if 
Bulgaria purchases aircraft and if Slovakia en-
ters into the lease). These will be not the most 
cutting-edge (a total of 28 Czech and Hungari-
an Gripens, and possibly four Slovakian ones) or 
de facto outdated machines (F-16 in Romania 
and possibly in Bulgaria). With the exception 
of Slovakia, whose decision made in August 
has perpetuated the limited presence of its air 
force in NATO, all the countries in the region 
have withdrawn or are planning to withdraw 
fighters based on Soviet construction from mil-
itary service. In effect, a maximum of four com-
bat aircraft squadrons will be in operation in 
an area of 570,000 km² in the coming years. 
Furthermore, these will be relatively small 
squadrons, formed by between twelve and 
fourteen aircraft each (the average number of 
aircraft per squadron being sixteen in NATO 
member states). Against this background, Po-
land, which has 48 quite modern F-16C/D air-
craft and 30 MiG-29 aircraft, which have been 
modernised in co-operation with Israel (plus 48 
Su-22 fighter-bomber aircraft, due to be with-
drawn from military service in the middle of 
this decade) is an exception. 
As compared to the other NATO member 
states, the total effort from the region’s coun-
tries is similar to the one made by between 
a small and a medium-sized country (following 
cuts, Holland’s air force has 42 F-16 aircraft, 
and Norway has 57 F-16 aircraft; however, both 
of these countries are planning to introduce the 
first F-35 aircraft already before the end of this 
decade). Poland excluded, the total potential of 
Central Europe’s combat air force is lower than 
that of most single European NATO/EU mem-
ber states. From among the countries which 
have combat aircraft, at present only Portugal 
and Denmark – if reserve machines are not tak-
en into account – have less aircraft. However, 
in aggregate Scandinavia, which shares with 
Central Europe the fact that it is a NATO/EU 
frontier region, has over 280 combat aircraft 
(not counting the reserve machines). Turkey, 
on the opposite flank, has more than 400 com-
bat aircraft. Furthermore, the countries on the 
northern and southern flanks are currently im-
plementing programmes aimed at obtaining 
fifth generation MRCA or upgrading the ma-
chines they have to the 4+ generation standard. 
Future co-operation?
Since the Central European countries under dis-
cussion are set to have a small number of com-
bat aircraft in use, the issue of joint training 
for pilots (joint purchase and/or maintenance 
of advanced training aircraft) will have to be 
put on the agenda. The Czech Republic is the 
only country in the entire region to have main-
tained the capability to manufacture a relatively 
modern advanced training aircraft that can also 
carry out combat tasks (L-159 ALCA in stock in 
the air forces). If not more than one squadron 
of combat aircraft is to be in use, maintaining 
or gaining (except the Czech Republic) for one 
alone country to seek the capability of advanced 
training of combat aircraft pilots is uneconom-
ic in all respects. Poland is an exception, even 
though it has put off the decision to buy more 
MRCA at least until the end of this decade (the 
Polish-US agreement of 2003 included the op-
tion of the purchase of a further 48 F-16C/D 
aircraft), since it intends to buy between eight 
When the machines based on Soviet 
construction are withdrawn from mili-
tary service, a maximum of four combat 
aircraft squadrons will be in operation 
in an area of 570,000 km². 
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and twelve advanced training machines. It is 
therefore very likely that the countries from this 
region – unless they reach an agreement on the 
joint training of pilots (and technical staff) of 
combat aircraft and possibly on the joint pur-
chase of adequate machines – will search for 
external services of this kind either in groups or 
as single states. 
One factor which contributes to such co-opera-
tion is the fact that the countries in this region 
have similar combat aircraft. The constructions 
of F-16 and JAS-39 are in many regards simi-
lar, they have the same drive unit and use the 
same weapon sets, and, above all, they are 
designed to fulfil the same tactical guidelines. 
The differences regarding their joint operation 
and use are primarily of a commercial nature. 
The Czech Republic and Hungary do not own 
the machines they have. Therefore, if they want 
to make any modifications to the aircraft or use 
them outside their airspace, they must seek 
consent from Sweden (this issue was raised, 
for example, during the discussion on the pos-
sible engagement of the Czech Republic in the 
operation in Libya). Similarly, the United States 
has been attempting to restrict the independ-
ence of F-16 users as much as possible for the 
benefit of its own industry. It is worth pointing 
out that the countries in this region at the be-
ginning of the previous decade were planning 
to jointly choose one type of MRCA. If these 
plans had been fulfilled, co-operation would 
have been much easier. Nevertheless, the pres-
ent situation has not rendered co-operation 
impossible, and the policy adopted by some 
countries facilitates co-operation (Bulgaria and 
Romania signed an agreement on co-operation 
in air policing operations in 2012). A real ob-
stacle to co-operation could emerge if Bulgaria 
purchases the German Typhoon fighters, which 
have totally different construction and tactical 
assumptions. This obstacle would above all lim-
it Sofia’s co-operation capabilities, but it would 
also raise the co-operation costs for all the 
other countries in this region. However, even 
if Central European co-operation in maintain-
ing, modernising and in the use of combat air 
forces turns out to be successful, this region’s 
status as the worst secured part of NATO’s air-
space is becoming entrenched. 
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APPENDIX
The numbers of combat aircraft (fighters and multi-role machines) stocked by Central 
European countries compared to the other NATO member states bordering on them 
and the other countries on NATO/EU eastern flank
Western aircraft Soviet aircraft Planned type (by 2020)
Countries in the region
Bulgaria - 15 MiG-29A F-16A/B**
Czech Republic 14 JAS-39C/D - JAS-39C/D
Romania 12* F-16A/B 48 MiG-21 Lancer F-16A/B
Slovakia - 12 MiG-29AS -
Hungary 14 JAS-39C/D - JAS-39C/D
Poland 48 F-16C/D 31 MiG-29A F-16C/D
Other countries
Finland 61 F-18A/B - F-18A/B modernised
Germany 221 Typhoon, Tornado - Typhoon
Norway 57 F-16A/B - F-35
Sweden 134 JAS-39C/D - JAS-39E/F
Turkey 402 F-16C/D, F-4E - F-35
* contracted
** most likely
